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A CHALLENGE TO TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS:  
APPLYING THE SOCIAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION TO 





Research approaches to governance within the third sector have generally followed similar 
lines to those found within governance research in the corporate business sector using the 
same economic based theoretical models (for example: Bradshaw et al 1992; Green and 
Griesinger 1996; Cornforth and Edwards 1999; Steane and Christie 2001; Brown 2002, 2005).  
There is very limited evidence of research built upon sociological paradigms associated with 
the unique characteristics of third sector organisations, with one notable exception being the 
work of Chait et al (2005). 
 
Conventional governance thinking focuses primarily on productive efficiency and strategic 
aspects of an organisation using economic instrumental rationality (Zahra and Pearce 1989; 
Bradshaw et al 1992; Nicholson and Kiel 2004).  For businesses with a purpose of profit 
maximisation this may be particularly legitimate and be the main focus of a director’s work.  
However, much more is demanded of directors of third sector organisations (TSOs) because 
of the unique mission focused and value-based characteristics of the organisations they 
govern.  Without undermining the importance of both fiduciary and strategic modes of 
thinking in respect to governance, Chait et al (2005) suggested that an expansive way of 
thinking was required which they identified as a ‘generative mode of thinking’ (as shown in 
Figure 1).   
 
 
However, they ‘found no model or ‘best practice” of institutionalized generative governance 
to share’ (Chait et al 2005: 104).  Nevertheless, theoretical bases that are aligned with the 
rationality associated with generative thinking do exist.  One such basis is Jugen Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action (TCA).  This theory is considered appropriate to the 
governance of TSOs, because it focuses on co-ordinated action through understanding, not 
control or manipulation, and is a theoretical frame embedded within a sociological paradigm, 
rather than one related to an economic paradigm as is the common case in much governance 
research.   
 
The first section of this study presents different types of rationality in order to demonstrate 
that the instrumental rationality upon which economics is based is not the only form of 
Figure 1: Modes of thinking within Governance as Leadership 
(Chait, Ryan and Taylor 2005) 
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rationality appropriate to the social sciences.  This is followed by a review of sociologically 
based governance studies and an introduction to the notion of generative thinking.  The theory 
of communicative action and its application to governance of TSOs is then discussed.  The 
final section presents future research directions and summarises the contributions of adopting 
this approach.  
 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF RATIONALITY 
 
Kemmis and McTaggart (2003: 2003) conceded the ‘ubiquity of the functional reason [i.e. 
“instrumental” or “technical” reason] characteristic of the social systems that structure great 
tracts of our social realities’ yet identified two other kinds of reasoning that serve different 
knowledge-constitutive interests other than the individual-objective interest.  These are 
‘practical’ reason, and ‘critical’ or ‘emancipatory’ reason (Kemmis and McTaggart 2003: 
362).  In addition, Aberbach and Christensen (2003: 493) identified ‘political rationality’, and 
Habermas (1984) contrasted ‘communicative rationality’ with ‘instrumental’ rationality. 
O'Donnell recognised that   
Teleological or goal-oriented action involves a decision based on instrumental, 
means-end, or purposive rationality in Weber’s sense given a certain 
interpretation of a situation.  A variant is “strategic action” in which the actor 
takes into account the likely behaviour of other goal-directed actors.  
Habermas stresses that although the teleological-instrumental structure is 
fundamental to all forms of action, it is too often taken to be the sole form of 
rational action in other conceptualizations of rationality, a fact he refers to as 
one of the ‘illusions of modernity’ (O'Donnell 1999: 253, emphasis added). 
 
Prior to considering communicative rationality in more detail, the pervasiveness of the 
economic instrumental rationality underlying theories commonly associated with governance 
research will be briefly considered.  One of the ‘illusions of modernity is the common 
acceptance that  governance approaches embedded within an economic paradigm using 
instrumental rationality is the most beneficial way to think about governance.  The core tenant 
of this economic instrumental paradigm is that ‘actors think and act strategically to fulfil 
personal goals and are primarily utility-maximizing individuals’ (Aberbach and Christensen 
2003: 497).  The main players within this common paradigm are shareholders and executive 
managers, described using economic metaphors as ‘principals’ and ‘agents’.  The board’s 
traditional role is to ensure that the agent’s interests are met and that maximum returns on 
shareholder investments are achieved while keeping within the law and upholding social 
norms. Numerous theories have been proposed to enlighten this process. Each theory 
influences the way the board is structured and functions.  Some of these will now be 
considered briefly. 
 
The most pervasive theory underlying much governance research and practice is agency 
theory (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Dalton et al 1998; Hendry 2002; Miller 2002; Brown 2005).  By believing 
that managers are utility-maximising-agents, monitoring and control of these agents by the 
board is seen as of prime importance. In direct contrast, stewardship theory perceives 
managers in the opposite way, as agents who are not merely self- interested, but who have the 
good of the organisation at heart (Jeavons 1994; Davis et al 1997; Smallman 1999). 
Maximising the returns for the shareholders in this situation is achieved by the board ensuring 
appropriate support of the agents, rather than controlling them.  Paradox theory recognises 
that there is truth in both of these positions and instead of it being an either/or situation, 
8th Biennnial Conference of ANZTSR 2006 
Adelaide, 26-28 November 
4 
concludes that both control and support are vital (Demb and Neubauer 1992; Lewis 2000; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003; Cornforth 2004).  Resource dependence theory sees that 
the role of the board is to help management maximise resource usage that is available from 
different stakeholders in order to maximise benefit to shareholders (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Guthrie and Olian 1991; Alexander and Weiner 1998; Hillman et al 2000; Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003).  Stakeholder theory recognises that there are many other people and groups 
apart from shareholders that are affected by a company (Freeman 1984; Clarkson 1995; 
Abzug and Webb 1999; La Porta et al 1999; Barrett 2001; Steane 2001; Aguilera and Jackson 
2003; Bhasa 2004; Balser and McClusky 2005).  The board’s role is seen as assisting 
management care for these additional interests, while at the same time maximising returns for 
shareholders. Irrespective of which theory is proposed, the common thread is maximising 
shareholder return on investment - clearly an economic interest.  
 
With respect to governance research of TSOs, while agency theory is also commonly used, 
there is increasing appeal in theories that are considered to have more relevance to mission 
driven organisations (Hough et al 2004).  As such, stewardship theory is attractive, because it 
is widely accepted that the majority of executive managers of TSOs are deeply interested in 
the mission of the organisations they manage and are not just self-serving individuals 
(Jeavons 1994; Hough et al 2004).  Stakeholder theory is also common as TSOs often have a 
variety of investors and supporters with a range of interests and beneficiaries/clients of the 
organisation are seen as vital stakeholders (Steane 2001; Balser and McClusky 2005).  
 
There is no question that these theories can assist in helping to guide certain aspects of 
governance within TSOs.  However, the economic-biased, systems-focussed, instrumental-
means-end rationality associated with these theories remains a major limitation for 
organisations whose mission is sociologically embedded.  There is a lack of appreciation for 
the fact that ‘human beings are not merely economic beings, but also political, cultural and 
moral beings’ (Boston et al 1996: 30).  There is a need to reconnect with ‘questions of 
meaning, value, and significance, and of exercising personal and collective agency for the 
common good’ (Kemmis and McTaggart 2003:. 380).  Humanitarian development work is 
complex and far from being instrumentally rational.  While logical frameworks are commonly 
used in humanitarian project design documents, it is frequently found that the social context 
in which development programs take place has a different kind of rationality and carefully 
laid plans rarely work out as expected.  The tension between the reality of the social context 
and economic biased organisational systems is very real in the humanitarian aid context.  
Aberbach and Christensen (2003: 499) identify similar challenges within the domain of state 
governance.  For governance of organisations working in such situations to be effective, a 
new paradigm of thinking that can provide a better linking of social context and systems is 
seen as necessary. Because of this, it is considered more appropriate to seek a theory from 
within a sociological paradigm to assist in understanding governance of TSOs.   
 
Sociological based governance studies 
The most notable recent study built on a sociological paradigm was the culmination of a 
three-year research project between BoardSource and the Hauser Centre for Nonprofit 
Organizations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (Chait et 
al 2005).  The authors considered that the fundamental problem with governance in TSOs was 
not poor performance, but lack of clarity of purpose, both in relation to the governing board 
and within the organisation as a whole.  They saw this as being related to a lack of 
understanding of the complex characteristics of a modern nonprofit organisation which they 
consider to be innately ‘nonrational and generative’ (Chait et al 2005: 105).  In this respect 
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they asserted that ‘organisations are not merely the sum of their productive and logical 
aspects…. [there are also] expressive aspects of organizations, where people are concerned 
not with productivity or logic alone, but also with values, judgements, and insights’ (Chait et 
al 2005: 30). 
 
Chait et al (2005) suggested that effective practice of generative thinking, along with both 
fiduciary and strategic thinking by governing directors will provide ‘governance as 
leadership’.  They regarded generative thinking as vital to preventing ‘raw power contests’ or 
‘shifting coalitions of politics’ or the dictates of ‘outsiders’ (such as donors) being the means 
of steering an organisation.  However, generative thinking processes are also able to help 
‘facilitate consensus’ and release the potential within the sociological dimensions of the 
organisation (Chait et al 2005: 30).   
 
While no formal definition of generative thinking is provided by Chait and his colleagues, the 
following excerpts from the same study provide insights into their understanding of its 
meaning.  Generative thinking is considered to lie ‘somewhere between the insights of 
individuals and the paradigm shifts of fields’ (Chait et al 2005: 80).  It precedes ‘mission 
setting, strategy development and problem solving’ (Chait et al 2005: 80).  It is what 
generates visions, purposes, strategies, hypotheses and ideas.  Generative thinking ‘generates 
the moral commitments that missions codify, the goals that strategies advance and the 
diagnoses that problem solving addresses’ (Chait et al 2005: 82).  It is easy to see what it 
produces but it is more difficult to identify and understand how it works – yet it can be 
encouraged, supported and leveraged.  Generative thinking is a subjective process that 
‘produces a sense of what knowledge, information and data mean’ (Chait et al 2005: 84).  
This can open up multiple choices from which strategies can be selected.  In the processes of 
problem solving; it identifies questions and provides frameworks to guide problem solving.  It 
‘provides a sense of problems and opportunities’ (Chait et al 2005: 79). 
 
For Chait et al (2005), generative thinking refers to ‘a cognitive process that dozens of 
theorists in several disciplines have, in whole or part, described by different names … 
[including] Karl Weick (‘sense-making’); Donald Schon (‘reflective practice’); Henry 
Mintzberg (‘emergent strategy’); Ronald Heifetz (‘adaptive leadership’); Michael Polanyi 
(‘personal knowledge’); Robert Birnbaum (‘cognitive complexity’); Lee Bolman and 
Terrence Deal (‘framing organizations’); and James March and Michael Cohen (‘sensible 
foolishness’)” (Chait et al 2005: 83).  
 
In his review of an early part of the Chait et al study, Ruegger (2004) claimed that the 
generative process is easiest to grasp by starting at the end, describing the results of 
generative thinking, and then looking backwards to see what produces the output.  Generative 
thinking uses cues, clues, frames and retrospective thinking to produce a sense of meaning.  In 
fact, it is the starting point for governing, providing the development of mission setting, 
strategy development and problem solving.  If boards are able to move beyond the routine 
planning and organising and think together, they could then expand on the essence of a great 
idea and produce. 
 
The recommendations of Chait et al (2005) are supported by research on open system theory 
and organisations by Levasseur (2004) who concluded that in order to gain realistic answers 
to complex questions, proper specified feedback models were necessary.  There was found to 
be a need to go beyond ‘making hard decisions based on financial analysis alone’, and instead 
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to ‘include (complementary) symbolic and substantive actions’ relative to various 
organisational stakeholders (Levasseur 2004: 84).  
 
Charan (2005) also supports this perspective and describes boards that add value to a 
corporation as being ‘progressive’ boards (in contrast to ‘ceremonial’ and ‘liberated’ boards).  
In his opinion, such boards are identified by three outstanding characteristics (which show a 
close relationship to the concepts associated with generative thinking).  The first characteristic 
is effective group dynamics since in the boardroom, ‘every voice is heard… meetings are very 
open… Directors can interact with anybody, at any time.  New ideas arise spontaneously as 
individuals build on each other’s perspectives and those ideas get aired and tested by the 
group’ (Charan 2005: 29).  Secondly, there must be appropriate information architecture 
because ‘boards need the right information in the right format at the right time’ in a 
comprehensible manner (Charan 2005: 47).  The third characteristic is a focus on substantive 
issues arising because ‘as boards take charge of how they work, they must also take charge of 
what they work on… Compliance is a necessity, but it doesn’t make a board a competitive 
advantage.  To fully evolve and contribute, boards must meet the challenge of keeping one 
eye on compliance and a second eye on the issues that are central to the business’ (Charan 
2005: 61). 
 
To help answer this question within a theoretical paradigm that is not based on the common 
economic, instrumental-rational paradigm that most governance practices are based upon, a 
rationale is provided for using Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action as a guiding 
frame.  This theory is embedded within a sociological paradigm and is considered to better 
suit the characteristics of TSOs whose mission is focussed on human social development, and 
not profit maximization. 
 
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action (TCA) has been selected on the basis of the 
considered benefits in using a sociological embedded theory to understand governance in 
TSOs.  While Habermas is ‘one of the most fruitful and most often quoted authors in modern 
sociology’ (Mitrovic 1999: 217), his TCA has not yet been used to inform any studies on 
governance within the third sector.  However, it has been used in relation to studies of 
communication within a social development context (Jacobson 2003, 2004; Jacobson and 
Storey 2004) and by researchers within the public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin 1997; 
English and Guthrie 2003; Kelly 2004).  In addition, Deflem (1994) used it to inform a study 
on social control, and O'Donnell and a number of colleagues used it in studies of intellectual 
capital (O'Donnell 1999; O'Donnell, et al 2000; O'Donnell and Henriksen 2002; O'Donnell et 
al 2003; O'Donnell 2004).   
 
While the theory of communicative action is commonly applied to broader societal issues, it 
is appropriate to governance in TSOs because of its focus on coordinated action through 
understanding, not control or manipulation.  As Habermas states, ‘I shall speak of 
communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not 
through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding’ 
(Habermas 1984: 285-6).  The emphasis is that action is bought about as a result of 
communication and communication itself is a key type of action.  To this end, Jacobson 
(2003: 103) asserted that ‘the focal issue is not whether one is communicating in the sense of 
exchanging information.  The focal issue is what one’s actions accomplish in relation to 
others… Habermas defines communicative action as action oriented toward understanding.  
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Action oriented toward manipulation, rather than understanding, is treated as non-
communicative and labelled strategic action.’   
 
In contrast to the ‘cognitive-instrumental rationality’ associated with economic theories in 
which the focus is on subject-object relationships where material objects and ‘human 
resources’ are manipulated for benefit, the TCA focuses on ‘communicative rationality’ 
evident when people through speech and action come to an understanding with one another 
about something of importance to each other without strategic interference (Habermas 1984: 
392).  Communicative action refers to 
the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who 
establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or extra-verbal means). 
The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their 
plans of action in order to co-ordinate their actions by way of agreement.  The 
central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating 
definitions of the situation [that] admit of consensus (Habermas 1984: 86). 
 
It is accepted that the conventional perspective of governance is very much about ‘control’, as 
seen in the UK Cadbury committee’s definition of corporate governance as ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury 1992: par 2.5, emphasis added).  
However, it is argued that this is primarily because of the economic rationale behind 
conventional understanding. In contrast, the root of the term ‘governance’ originates in the 
Greek word kybernan and refers to the function of ‘steersmanship’.  As Beer explained, ‘at 
sea the long ships battled with rain, wind and tides – matters no way predictable.  However, if 
the man operating the rudder kept his eye on a distant lighthouse, he could manipulate the 
tiller, adjusting continuously in real-time towards the light’ (Beer 2004: 853).  Operating the 
rudder was the function of the kybernan. (This word transliterates into English as cybernetes. 
In Latin kybernan is transformed into gubernator, which in English is translated ‘governor’.)  
While the concept of ‘steersmanship’ may have an element of control, it has the potential for 
a richer depth of meaning.  This depth is evident in the cybernetic perspective of governance 
of nested organisations as being ‘a matter of autonomous networked organizations achieving 
cohesion’ (Espinosa et al 2004: 578, emphasis added).  
 
At the core of the TCA is the recognition that communicative rationality is different from 
instrumental means-end rationality:  
The instrumental means-end rationality of the systems of money and power is 
geared to success, efficiency, control, profit or market share.  In contrast, the 
communicative rationality of the human lifeworld is geared to understanding 
and agreement (Habermas 1987 cited by O’Donnell and Henriksen 2002:.93). 
 
‘Steersmanship’ could consequently be conceived as operating within either dimensions of 
rationality.  While organisations whose purpose is profit maximisation may predominantly 
use ‘directed and controlled’ approaches to governance underpinned by instrumental means-
end rationality with a focus on subject-object relationships, it is proposed that ‘steersmanship’ 
within organisations whose purpose is humanitarian wellbeing would be better served by 
governance approaches that are guided by communicative rationality with a focus on subject-
subject relationships as found in the TCA.  
 
A further important contribution of Jurgen Habermas associated with the TCA is the concept 
of modern society being comprised of a complex ‘lifeworld’ that can be impacted by powerful 
social systems (economic, political and legal-normative) through ‘steering media’ of money 
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and power (as shown in Figure 2). Within the lifeworld, people lead their everyday lives by 
establishing more or less direct relationships with each other (Mitrovic 1999: 220).  In an 
ideal situation, the lifeworld can develop and reproduce itself through processes of 
communicative action free from coercive, manipulative or strategic influences of the systems 
of money and power.  The lifeworld is composed of various interacting and integrated 
elements, including physical, social and personal aspects.  This gives rise to understandings 








According to Habermas, in an ‘ideal speech’ situation, communicative action is achieved 
when two general rules are adhered to: (1) that there is no manipulation involved in the 
communication, and (2) that everything communicated is open to question about its validity 
(White 1988: 56).  Understanding that leads to action is achieved when the better argument is 
selected as a result of reciprocal discourse relative to four validity claims: (1) that the 
statement communicated is true with respect to the objective world; (2) that the statement is 
right with respect to the normative, social world; (3) that the statement is honest in respect to 
the speaker’s subjective world, and (4) that the statement is comprehensible (Habermas 1984: 
99).  This validation occurs implicitly as well as explicitly. In situations where the steering 
media of money or power result in manipulative or strategic interruptions to the free and open 
validation of communication in respect to any of these above validity claims, ‘then 
“colonisation’ of the lifeworld is considered to have occurred (Habermas 1987: 196).  
 
These characteristics of TCA provide a new lens by which governance of TSOs can be 
considered.  Thus, governance can be defined as  
the organisational steering mechanism that uses communicative actions to 
guide the activities within an organisation’s lifeworld so that organisational 
purpose is achieved, free from manipulation and colonisation by external 
systems of power and money.  
 
Governing boards are the predominant means through which this can be achieved.  However, 
the TCA provides a plausible theoretical basis upon which to analyse generative leadership of 
a governing board of directors.  The core principle of generative thinking as espoused by 
Figure 2: A diagrammatic representation of Habermas’ concept of society. 
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Chait et al (2005) and referred to earlier are aligned with the concepts of communicative 
action.  The TCA provides what they said was needed – ‘a strategy for understanding’ and a 
means to ‘raise the quality of discourse’ where questions are no longer treated ‘as options but 
as devices for understanding their organisations’ (Chait et al 2005: 131, 126, 123).  Instead of 
board meetings being strategic, manipulative events where power struggles occur, trustees are 
‘licensed to raise questions’, have ‘permission to challenge dubious assumptions or 
questionable strategies’, and the board’s prevalent norms encourage ‘uninhibited 




The model of governance as leadership proposed by Chait and colleagues opens up 
possibilities to help identify how governing board directors of TSOs can most effectively 
ensure that their organisation’s core purpose for existing remains the main focus of the 
organisation’s management’s attention within an environment of increasing extra demands.  
This leads to a specific question to be addressed in future research: Can generative thinking 
by governing board directors help to keep TSOs focussed on their core purpose?  The TCA 
and associated lifeworld concepts, when combined with the concepts of governance as 
leadership, provide a rationale for the following two hypotheses that will help predict answers 
to this question (the example given relates to a faith-based TSO).   
 
The first hypothesis proposes that governing boards that engage primarily in fiduciary and 
strategic modes of thinking and neglect generative thinking will be predominantly focussed 
on issues relating to donors and other peripheral religious/institutional interests rather than 
core organisational purpose issues.  In this situation, the governing board’s main attention is 
directed externally to the systems of money and power that have claims on the organisation. 
The board works strategically with instrumental rationality to ensure that the organisation’s 
practices harmonise with such a focus (Figure 3A).  As a consequence, the systems associated 
with money (for example, donors) and power (for example, church administration), have a 
colonising influence over the lifeworld of the organisation.  
 
 
Figure 3: Simplified schematic demonstrating two hypotheses in respect to 
governance of a faith-based TSO informed by the theory of communicative action. 
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In contrast, a second governance approach works in a subtly different manner in which 
directors are fully aligned with the organisation’s core purpose and work through 
communicative action to ensure that the forces of money and power support the lifeworld of 
the organisation without colonising it (as shown in Figure 3B).  Thus the second hypothesis is 
that governing boards that engage regularly in generative thinking to support fiduciary and 
strategic modes of thinking will be predominantly focussed on issues relating to the core 
purpose of the organisation and will work to ensure that donors and other peripheral 
religious/institutional interests are harnessed in support of the core purpose. 
 
The predominant mode of operation of directors in this situation would be generative 
thinking, and strategic processes would be engaged to ensure that steering media enhance the 
lifeworld of the organisation and that colonisation by such is prevented.  Fiduciary 
responsibilities would still be met, but not at the expense of increasingly effective mission 
accomplishment. 
 
One of the key characteristics of Habermas’ TCA, as observed by Jacobson (2004: 8) is its 
empirical orientation.  The concept of ideal speech referred to above is advanced in the form 
of an hypothesis.  Reciprocal expectations regarding validity claims are taken to comprise 
rules that all human beings employ in the generation of speech as a pragmatic, real, and 
universal necessity.  Linking ideal speech acts as evidence of generative thinking of a 
governing board will provide an opportunity to use the TCA to evaluate the quality of 
generative thinking within a governance context.  
 
Gaining information to help understand the dynamics of generative thinking in the context of 
a governing board, and being able to use this information to help board directors keep their 
organisations mission focussed will require participatory, action oriented inquiry approaches. 
A participatory action research strategy (Kemmis and McTaggart 2003) is consequently 
proposed as the most suitable strategy for future research in this area.  This would enable 
board directors themselves and relevant others at various levels within the hierarchy of the 
organisation to be intimately involved in the inquiry process.  The desire in this is that 
participants will be able to see the local setting in which they are involved as connected to 
wider social and historical conditions.  This would involve ‘illuminating and clarifying 
interconnections and tensions between elements of a setting in terms that participants 
themselves regard as authentic’ (Kemmis and McTaggart 2003: 347).   
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the attempt to frame governance using a new paradigm 
based upon communicative rationality rather than instrumental rationality.  This is particularly 
useful for TSOs whose core purpose is societal improvement rather than shareholder wealth.  
It will also lead to increased understanding of culture, society and human interactions, as well 
as processes to aid in the achievement of this understanding. 
 
Framing governance in relation to generative thinking also promotes new ways to help bring 
about improvements in society using cooperative, communicative processes free from 
coercion and manipulation.  Other outcomes for TSOs could be a greater awareness the role 
they play within society, new insights in respect to empowerment of board directors that 
could be applicable to a wide range of organisations and adoption of new approaches and 
tools to help people work more productively together in groups. 
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The understanding gained through this research has limitations relative to its generalisability. 
However, critical theory acknowledges that each situation is the result of specific historical 
and social processes.  Expecting that wide reaching solutions to socially constructed problems 
can be achieved through a limited research processes is not realistic. The greatest benefits will 
be the lessons learned from the process of applying this theory within the context of a 
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